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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
THERMOID WESTERN CO., NORMAN
THOMPSON LUMBER & HARDWARE CO., INC., UTAH POULTRY
& FARMERS COOPERATIVE, UTAH
LUMBER CO., and STOKERMATIC
CO., on their own behalf and on behalf
of other persons, corporations, and associations similarly situated,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.

Case No.
9254

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, THE DENVER AND RIO
GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD
COMPANY, THE WESTERN PACIFIC COMPANY and BAMBERGER
RAILROAD COMPANY,
Defendants and Respondents.

Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants

INTRODUCTION
The plaintiffs and appellants are firms and associations
doing business within the state of Utah and which ship freight
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intrastate by railroad within the state of Utah. The defendants
are railroads operating through and within the state of Utah.
This is an action to recover the difference between the
freight rates charged by the defendant railroads to the plaintiffs and proper and valid charges as established by the tariffs
on file with and approved by the Public Service Commission
of Utah. The period of time covered by this action is from
June 22, 1956 to August 28, 1958.
This action concerns only the liability of the defendants
for the overcharges. The parties have stipulated that the
amount of the overcharges shall be determined in a subsequent
accounting if the issue of liability is found against the defendants.
The action was filed in the Third Judicial District Court
in Salt Lake County. The defendants filed notice of removal
to the federal court on the alleged grounds that the plaintiffs'
recovery depended upon an interpretation of a federal law.
Judge Willis W. Ritter denied the motion of the plaintiffs
to remand and restrained counsel for the plaintiffs from bringing any like actions for other clients in the state courts. On
appeal, the United States Circuit Court, Tenth Circuit, decided
that there was no federal question involved, ordered the injunction dissolved and ordered the case remanded to the state
court.*
*This decision is reported at 269 Fed. 2nd 714. The case is entitled
Structural Steel & Forge Co. et al v. Union Pacific RR, et al, because
the appeal was actually taken by Structural Steel and Forge Co., which,
although .not a party to the action, was restrained by the federal
district court from bringing an action of its own in the state courts
allegedly because the court had to do that to protect its jurisdiction

4
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Upon trial of the issues affecting liability in the state court,
the Hon. Ray VanCott held in favor of the defendants and
against the plaintiffs on the question of liability.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the year 1951 the major railroads operating tn the
United States made application to the Interstate Commerce
Commission for an increase of 15% in interstate freight rates
and charges. This permission was granted by the Interstate
Commerce Commission in a proceeding known as Ex Parte 175.
At the same time the rna jor railroads operating in and
through Utah made application to the Public Service Commission of Utah for an increase of 15% in Utah intrastate
freight rates and charges. After a hearing before the Public
Service Commission of Utah on this application, the application was denied for lack of sufficient evidence without
prejudice to the rights of the railroads to reopen and introduce
additional evidence.
The railroads took no further proceedings before the
Public Service Commission of Utah, but made application
to the Interstate Commerce Commission to increase the Utah
intrastate rates under the provisions of 49 U.S.C. 13 (3) ( 4)
on the alleged ground that the Utah rates were so low as to
cast a burden on interstate commerce. After hearing, the Interstate Commerce Commission issued its order taking jurisdiction of the Utah intrastate rates and granting the increase
of this case-the Thermoid case. However, the issues involved in the
Structural Steel & Forge case in the lOth Circuit are the issues of this
case now being tried by this court.

5
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of 15% sought. In this Order the Interstate Commerce Commission ordered the 15% increase and informed the Public
Service Commission of Utah that it would have 30 days within
which to make the rates effective, otherwise the Interstate
Commerce Commission would, on its own order, place said
increased rates into effect.
The Public Service Commission declined to make the rates
effective on its order, and a final order was issued by the
Interstate Commerce Commission making the 15% increase
effective as to Utah intrastate traffic.
Thereafter the Public Service Commission and the Utah
Citizens Rate Association, of which organization some of the
plaintiffs herein are members, instituted an action in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah to set aside the
order of the Interstate Commerce Commission above referred
to. The case was heard by a Three-Judge court which granted
a tern porary restraining order pending a final decision of the
case. The Three-Judge court decided in a two to one decision
that the action of the Interstate Commerce Commission was
valid and legal and lifted the temporary restraining order
allowing the 15% increase to become applicable to Utah intrastate rates effective as of the 22nd day of June, 1956. The
Public Service Commission and the Utah Citizens Rate Association then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States frotn the order of the Three-Judge federal district court.
The United States Supreme Court, after hearing, reversed the
Three-Judge court with instructions to set aside the order of
the Interstate Commerce Commission and to remand the matter
to the Interstate Commerce Commission for further proceed-

6
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ings in conformity with the Supreme Court decision.* The
mandate of the Supreme Court was filed in the United States
District Court on August 27, 1958, on which date the Utah
intrastate rates reverted to their former level.
This action is to recover the additional 15% charged
by the railroads during the time the higher rates were in effect
between the date of the removal of the injunction by the United
States District Court and the filing of the mandate from the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Judge Van Cott held that the plaintiffs were not entitled
to recover. In seeking a reversal of this decision the plaintiffs
rely upon the following points:

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION HAD
JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE ORDER INCREASING
UTAH INTRASTATE RATES.

POINT 'fWO
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE ORDER OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION RAISING UTAH INTRASTATE RATES WAS
NOT VOID BUT ONLY VOIDABLE.
*Public Service Commission of Utah et al v. United States of America
et al, 356 U. S. 421, 2 L.ed. (2nd) 886.
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POINT THREE
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFFS MUST SHOW A BASIS FOR RECOVERY
UPON EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES BEFORE JUDGMENT
COULD BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS.

POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE ACT OF THE RAILROADS IN MAILING THE
TARIFFS EFFECTUATING THE INCREASE TO THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AS AUTHORIZED BY
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, BUT AS
DENIED BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH WAS AN EFFECTIVE FILING UNDER THE LAWS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH.

POINT FIVE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE SUBSEQUENT ORDER OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ISSUED IN DECEMBER, 1959,
REP AIRED THE DEFECTS FOUND BY THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE EARLIER ORDER.

POINT SIX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
AN APPLICATION TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH FOR REPARATIONS IS A PREREQUI8
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SITE TO THE BRINGING OF AN ACTION IN THE
COURTS TO RECOVER AN OVERCHARGE.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION HAD
JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE ORDER INCREASING
UTAH INTRASTATE RATES.
POINT TWO
Tl-IE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE ORDER OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION RAISING UTAH INTRASTATE RATES WAS
NOT VOID BUT ONLY VOIDABLE.
As these two points are closely related, we will consider
them together for purposes of argument. It follows as a matter
of course that if the Interstate Commerce Commission was
without jurisdiction to enter the contested order, such order
was void from its inception.
The cases establishing the above principle are numerous.
Most of them are collected in the annotations contained in
An1erican Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris Secundum. Without
citing the cases, the following statements are the summary
drawn from these numerous cases by the authors of these two
works:
ccThe rendttion of a judgment without jurisdiction
is a usurpation of power and makes the judgment
9
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itself coram non judice and ipso facto void."
Am. Jur. 68).

(31

((A judgment which is void, as distinguished from
one which is merely voidable, or liable to be vacated
or set aside for irregularity or other cause, or reversed
for error, is a mere nullity and has no force or effect.
It is not binding on anyone; it raises no lien or estoppel; and it does not impair or affect the rights of anyone. It confers no rights on the party in whose favor
it is given and affords no protection to persons acting
un der 1t
. * * * *. " (49 c .J.s. 878 ) .
The jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission
in this case depends upon the fundamental division of governmental powers between the state and the federal government. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United
States gives to Congress the right to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce. The lOth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States reserves to the states or the people all
powers not expressly granted to the federal government. Prior
to the year 1919 the uniform holding of the courts was to
the effect that the agencies of the federal government had
no power to regulate or control intrastate rates, the rationale
of the decision being that such powers were powers reserved
to the states by the federal constitution.
In 1919 the landmark case of Houston E & W T RR Co.
v. U. S., 234 U.S. 242, 58 L.ed. 1541, made a significant change
in the case law in this regard. This case held that under
certain circumstances an agency of the federal government
could take jurisdiction of intrastate freight rates. The rationale
of this case is to the effect that because the railroads which
handle both intrastate and interstate shipments are a single
10
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economic unit, the federal government has the power to make
certain that the intrastate rates are not so low that they cast
a burden on interstate commerce. If they are so low that they
cast a burden on interstate commerce, then the federal government has jurisdiction, incident to its power to protect interstate commerce, to step in and remove this burden. However,
unless and until the burden is made to appear, there is no
jurisdiction in the federal agencies to touch the intrastate rates.
On February 28, 1920, Section 13 of the Interstate Commerce Act was passed. ( 49 U.S.C. 13 (3) ( 4)). This act
merely codifies the holding in the Houston case.
In every Section 13 case, therefore, the Interstate Commerce Commission must determine two distinct questions:
1. The Jurisdictional Question.

Are the intrastate rates so low that they do cast a
burden on interstate commerce; and
2. The Discretional Question.
How high must these intrastate rates be raised to
remove the discrimination.
If the first question, the jurisdictional question, is answered
in the negative, the Interstate Commerce Commission has no
power to proceed further.
Subsequent cases from the United States Supreme Court
make abundantly clear the fact that before a federal regulatory
agency rna y step in and issue any order touching a matter
ordinarily within the scope of state jurisdiction, the relationship
to the federal jurisdiction must clearly appear.
In the case of Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S.
11
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144; 99 L.ed. 35, the Supreme Court in considering a matter
where an attempt was being made to extend a federal regulation to certain matters in contravention of a state statute,
stated:
!'It also is contended that an interpretation must
prevail as a matter of principle which will give the
exemption a general and uniform operation in all states
irrespective of local law. It is, of course, true that uniform operation of a federal law is a desirable end and,
other things being equal, we often have interpreted
statutes to achieve it. But in no case relied upon did we
achieve uniformity at the cost of establishing overlapping authority over the same subject matter in the
state and in the federal government."
In interpreting the power of the Interstate Commerce
Commission to interfere in intrastate matters, the Supreme
Court time and again has reiterated the principle that this
power should be exercised with extreme caution and should be
exercised only where every element of federal jurisdiction
appears clearly of record. In the case of Palmer v. Massachu-

setts, 308 U.S. 78, 84 L.ed 93, the Court stated:
nTo be sure, in recent years Congress has from time
to time exercised authority over purely intrastate activities of an interstate carrier when, in the judgment of
Congres, an interstate carrier constituted, as a matter
of economic fact, a single organism and could not effectively be regulated as to some of its interstate phases
without drawing local business within the regulated
sphere. But such absorption of state authority is a
delicate exercise of legislative policy in achieving a
wise accommodation between the needs of central control and the lively maintenance of local institutions.
Therefore, in construing legislation this court has disfavored inroads by implication on state authority and

12
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resolutely confined restnctlons upon the traditional
po\ver of states to regulate their local transportation
to the plain mandate of Congress. Minnesota Rate
Cases (Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U.S. 352, 57 L.ed.,
1511, 33 S. Ct. 729, 48 LRA (NS) 1151, Ann. Cas.
1916A, 18; cf. Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 82
L.ed. 3, 58 S. Ct. 87."
This principle has been reiterated in other cases. See
Yonkers v. United StateJ, 320 U.S. 685; 88 L.ed 400; Alabama
Public Service Commission v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341; 95
L.ed 1022, and Arkansas R.R. Commission v. Chicago, Rock
Island and Pac. R.R. Co., 274 U.S. 597, 71 L.ed 1224.
A landmark case in this field is the case of North Carolina
v. United States, 325 U.S. 507, 89 L.ed 1760, wherein the
Supreme Court makes it very clear that before the Interstate
Commerce Commission may issue an order raising intrastate
rates, its jurisdiction must clearly appear. The language of that
case is as follows:
~ cIntrastate

transportation is primarily the concern
of the states. The power of the Interstate Commerce
Commission with reference to such intrastate rates is
dominant only so far as necessary to alter rates which
injuriously affect interstate transportation. American
Express Company v. South Dakota, 244 U.S. 617, L.ed.
1352. A scrupulous regard for maintaining the power
of the state in this field has caused this court to require
that the Interstate Commerce Commission's orders
giving precedence to Federal rates must meet ca high
standard of certainty.' Illinois Central Railroad v. State
Public Utilities Commission, 245 U.S. 493, 62 L.ed.
425. Before the Commission can nulify a state rate,
justification for the rexercise of Federal power must
clearly appeal.' Florida v. U.S. 282 U.S. 194, 75 L.ed.
291." (Emphasis added).

13
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When the railroads, therefore, allege that the Interstate
Commerce Commission has blanket jurisdiction to investigate
and raise intrastate rates and that any order made after the
investigation begins may be attacked only on the basis of an
abuse of discretion, they are ignoring these well-established
rules. The evidence must first establish the jurisdiction and
then if that is established, the evidence must establish the
amount of the rate raise justified. However, if the evidence does
not establish the jurisdiction, the Commission may not proceed
further, and any attempt to do so is a nullity.
In th case of Public Service Com1nission of Utah et al v.
United States of America, et al, 356 U.S. 421, 2 L.ed (2d)
886, the Sup~e~e Court held that the evidence was not sufficient
to show that Utah intrastate rates were so low as to cast a
burden on interstate commerce. Therefore, the power of the
federal government under the Commerce Clause, as interpreted by North Carolina v. United States, supra, did not arise
and the power to regulate intrastate rates still lay exclusively
with the state of Utah under the provisions of the lOth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Any attempt
of the federal government to exercise a jurisdiction which it
did not have under the Constitution and which the Congress
had not attempted to confer on it under the Interstate Commerce Act, was a nullity and void.
Section 54-3-7, Utah Code Annotated 195 3, provides
part as follows:

1n

nExcept as in this chapter otherwise provided, no
public utility shall charge, demand, collect or receive
a greater or less or different compensation for any
product or commodity furnished or to be furnished

14
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or for any services rendered or to be rendered than the
rates, tolls, rentals and charges applicable to such
products or commodity or services as specified in its
schedules on file and in effect at the time * * * ."
It is conceded by all in this case that the rates charged
were in excess of the tariffs on file with the Public Service
Commission, which had been approved and authorized by that
commission. It is conceded that the Public Service Commission
did not at any time authorize the filing and making effective
of the schedules effectuating the increase. In fact, the Public
Service Commission express! y refused to authorize such increase
at the time application was made to the Public Service Commission by the railroads (Exhibit 2, Page 43) and at the time
the Interstate Commerce Commission issued its ultimatum to
the Utah Commission (Exhibit 10) . Therefore, if the increased
rates are to have any validity at all, they must depend upon
the Interstate Commerce Commission order.
Although the ultimate issue was different when this case
was before the United States Circuit Court of Appeals on
the motion to remand, many of the subsidiary issues were
related. In that case (Structural Steel and Forge Company,
et al. v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, et al., 269 Fed. 2d
714) the Circuit Court states:
<(Stripped of its irrelevancies, the removed claim
is that defendant railroads exacted a rate for intrastate shipments in excess of those established and on
file with the competent state regulatory body, and the
prayer is for restitution of the same. In substance, it is
the same as the Structural Steel claim in the state court.
Surely both complaints state a claim on which relief
can be granted under the laws of the State of Utah,

15

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i.e., the right not to be required to pay a higher rate on
intrastate shipments than that prescribed by applicable
state law, rule or regulation. The reference then to
the void or vacated order of the Interstate Commerce
Commission as a basis for the charges, was not an
essential ingredient of the claim for restitution. * * *."
(Emphasis added.)
In asserting that they were protected by the void Interstate
Commerce Commission order prior to the time that it was set
aside, the railroads rely heavily upon the case of Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad Company v. Florida, 79 L. ed 1451, 295
U.S. 301. The Atlantic Coast Line case has certain superficial
points of similarity with this case, but it is basically entirely
different. In both cases the Interstate Commerce Commission
took jurisdiction of intrastate rates and authorized an increase.
In both cases the order was later set aside. In both cases the
plaintiffs were seeking to recover the higher rate collected
between the date of the Interstate Commerce Commission order
and the date it was set aside. These are the points of similarity
between the two cases. The points of difference, however,
completely distinguish these two cases. As was pointed out
by the Circuit Court of Appeals in Structural Steel and Forge
Company v. Union Pacific Railroad Company (supra):
nJurisdiction wise, our case is wholly unlike Atlantic
Coast Line v. Florida (supra) and United States v.
Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, where restitution was sought
in a federal court with conceded jurisdiction to review
the administrative rate-making process."
In the Atlantic Coast Line case the Interstate Commerce
Commission order was set aside because of a defect in the
findings of the Interstate Comn1erce Commission. The court

16
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held that the specific findings as to the evidence were not
sufficient to sustain the general findings. There was no holding
of any lack of evidence to give rise to the federal jurisdiction.
In the case now before this court, the Supreme Court in
Public Service Commission of Utah v. United States, supra,
found the evidence insufficient to sustain the federal Junsdiction. The language of the court is as follows:
nin the face of this proof, the evidence as to the
general similarity of conditions falls short of the high
standard of certainty required."
This difference is illustrated in the Atlantic Coast Line
case by the definite holding of the court to the effect that the
order was not void but voidable. This is in contrast to the case
of North Carolina v. United States above cited, in which case
as here, the court found that the evidence was not sufficient
to give rise to the jurisdiction of the federal body.
The principal distinction between this case and the
Atlantic Coast Line case, however, is the basis on which the
recovery was sought and the method by which it was sought.
Ifere we have come into the state court and are seeking recovery
on the grounds that the rates charged were in excess of those
permitted by a state statute. In the Atlantic Coast Line case
no such procedure was followed. There no state statute was
involved. In that case the plaintiffs made application to the
federal court on a supplemental motion in the very action
in which they had the Interstate Commerce Commission order
set aside. Their theory of recovery was that the federal district
court should have set aside the Interstate Commerce Commission order when application was made to it. If it had set
17
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the order aside at that time the Interstate Commerce Commission order would never have gone into effect. Having
failed to do this, the plaintiffs alleged, the federal court had
an equitable obligation to make the petitioners whole. The
Supreme Court held that there was no such equitable obligation
on a district court. Furthermore, the court held that as the
plaintiffs were proceeding in equity, the basic consideration
would be whether or not the rates which were actually charged
were unreasonably high, not whether they were in excess of
the schedules filed. In other words they held that the issue
was not whether the rates were ((illegal," but whether they
were ((unlawful." The distinction between these two terms
as it applies to freight rate matters will be discussed in the
next succeeding section.
The Supreme Court further held in the Atlantic Coast
Line case that as the Interstate Commerce Commission had
had a further hearing and had found that during all of the
period in question the railroads were actually in need of the
higher rates to have adequate compensation, the equitable basi~
for recovery could not stand. The language of the court is a~
follows:
tIn the absence of such a showing, the carrier doe!
not offend against equity or conscience in standing or
its position and keping what it got."
t

In the case now before this court, as we previously pointed
out, we are not proceeding in equity on the grounds that the
rates charged were higher than were necessary to yield a fair
return to the railroads. This is an extraneous matter. We are
proceeding on the grounds that the rates were Hillegal" because
they exceeded the only valid and effective tariffs on file.
]g
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furthermore, in this case the Interstate Commerce Commission in its subsequent report and order does not say anything which would indicate an attempt or desire to make the
new rates retroactive. The orders of the Interstate Commerce
Commission dated in December, 1959 and April, 1960 (Exhibits 11 and 12) do not find that during the period in question,
i.e. June 22, 1956 to August 28, 1958, the railroads needed
more revenue from intrastate rates. They find that they do
need more revenue from intrastate rates as of the date of
December 7, 1959. However, they do not make any attempt
to make either their order or their findings retroactive. The
situation resulting from this new Interstate Commerce Commission Order is exactly what the Circuit Court of Appeals
indicated it might be when on July 8, 1959 they issued their
opinion in Structural Steel & Forge Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., supra. There the court stated:
((Moreover, any final order establishing prevailing
rates after further hearing before the Interstate Commerce Commission may very well be prospective in
effect, leaving the subject matter of these actions unsupported by any valid order."
We wish to point out that this subsequent order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission is now under attack in the
United States Court for the District of Utah, the action challenging that order having been argued and submitted to that
court on the 8th day of August, 1960.
The Interstate Commerce Commission having been without jurisdiction to issue the order raising Utah intrastate rates,
the order \vas void from the beginning. The situation is entirely different from the Atlantic Coast Line case where the
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defect was not in the evidence and only in the findings and
the order therefore only voidable. The order having been void
the Interstate Commerce Commission could not make any
subsequent order retroactive even if it had tried to do so, as
can be seen by an examination of the subsequent order, it
did not attempt to do. The lower court therefore erred
in holding that the Interstate Commerce Commission had
jurisdiction to issue the increased rates. It had the power to
enter upon the hearing for the purpose of determining the
matter of jurisdiction, but when the evidence establishing
jurisdiction failed, it had no further power and the order
which it issued was void.
POINT THREE
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFFS MUST SHOW A BASIS FOR RECOVERY
UPON EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES BEFORE JUDGMENT
COULD BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS.
The trial court in its conclusions of law appears to imply
that the plaintiffs could recover if, but only if, they proved
that the rates actually charged were unreasonably high. This
is not the theory upon which this case is brought at all.
In the field of transportation law, there are two terms
which have come to have definite meaning in regard to excessive
rates. These terms are nillegal rates" and («unlawful rates."
An illegal rate is one in excess of the tariffs of the carrier on
file and in effect. Generally the filing of tariffs is done pursuant
to statutory requirement and as a usual thing the governmental
unit requiring the filing of the tariffs will also have a statute
20
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prohibiting the charging of more than the amounts established
by the tariff. Such a statute is Sec. 54-3-7, U.C.A., 1953.
An "unlawful" rate is one which, while in accordance
·with the tariff on file and in effect, is unreasonably high. In
other words, it much more than compensates the carrier for
the cost of hauling plus a reasonable return on its investment.
Rates which are "legal" may be ((unlawful" as a result of
a number of situations. First, the tariff may have been filed
without hearing, which may be done under certain circumstances, or second, conditions may have changed with the
passage of time so that a rate which was, when filed, both
legal and lawful has become unlawful even though it is still
legal. A good discussion of the distinction between legal and
lawful rates is found in the case of Arizona Grocery Co. v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 284 U. S. 370; 76 L.ed 349.
It is not necessary that a rate be both unlawful and illegal
in order to enable the shipper to recover the excess. He may
recover if it is either unlawful or illegal. In this regard the
following language is found in 13 C.J.S. at pages 770 and 771:
"Practically any charge in excess of the amount
\vhich the carrier is entitled to collect, under the rules
stated in §§ 312-314 supra, constitutes an overcharge
to the extent of the excess, ~rhile sums which the
carrier \vas lawfully entitled to collect cannot ordinarily be recovered as an overcharge, although they
were in excess of the rate charged a favored shipper.
Thus, there may be an overcharge because the rate
or charge applied violates a contract between the
parties, is unreasonable, is above the lawful tariff rate
or in excess of the rate fixed by law, because an error
was made by the carrier in the figuring of the mileage
21
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covered by the carriage, more goods were charged for
than were actually carried, the charges were computed
on the basis of a weight which was inaccurate and
improper, the charges included an additional charge
for an item or service for which the carrier is not
entitled to be compensated, or because the carrier has
shipped the goods over a longer route and charged
the tariff rate therefor when a shorter and cheaper
route was available."
The Arizona Grocery Company case supra in holding that
there was a right to recover in the event of the charging of
either an illegal or unlawful rate holds at 284 U.S. 384:
(Cin order to render rates definite and certain, and
to prevent discrimination and other abuses, the statute
required the filing and publishing of tariffs specifying
the rates adopted by the carrier, and made these the
legal rates, that is, those which must be charged to
all shippers alike. Any deviation from the published
rate was declared a criminal offense, and also a civil
wrong giving rise to an action for damages by the
injured shipper. Although the Act thus created a legal
rate it did not abrogate, but expressly affirmed, the
common-law duty to charge no more than a reasonable
rate, and left upon the carrier the burden of conforming its charges to that standard. In other words, the
legal rate was not made by the statute a lawful rate,it was lawful only if it was reasonable. Under § 6 the
shipper was bound to pay the legal rate; but if he
could show that it was unreasonable he might recover
reparation.''
It is obvious that an action to recover reparations on the
basis that the rate charged was unlawful places a much greater
burden of proof on the shipper than does an action for an
overcharge on an illegal rate. An action to recover under an
22
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unla\\·ful rate is purely an equitable action; almost in the
nature of an unjust enrichment action. The shipper must show
that the rate charged gave excessive returns to the carrier. In
such a proceeding, of course, carrier earnings and carrier costs
must be gone into, a things which is very difficult for a shipper
to do. The Atlantic Coast Line case which we discussed in the
next preceding section was such an action. The shippers were
attempting to recover on an equitable basis and not on a legal
basis, and the court held that the shippers had not shown
that the rates charged ((offend against equity or conscience."
An action to recover an excess under an illegal rate is
purely a legal action, generally based upon statute. The carrier
does not have to show the shipper's earnings, nor the cost
of rendering the service of hauling the shipper's merchandise.
The shipper need only show that the amount charged by the
carrier was in excess of the legal tariffs on file and in effect.
As is stated in the Arizona Grocery Case supra, nAny deviation from the published rate was declared a criminal offense,
and also a civil wrong giving rise to an action for damages
by the injured shipper."
The trial court erred therefore in holding that there was
any obligation on the plaintiffs in this case to show that the
rates charged were ((unlawful" or ((unreasonable."
POIN'T FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE ACT OF THE RAILROADS IN MAILING THE
TARIFFS EFFECTUATING THE INCREASE TO THE'
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AS AUTHORIZED BY
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THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, BUT AS
DENIED BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH WAS AN EFFECTIVE FILING UNDER THE LAWS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
The holding of the court to the effect that the higher tariffs
were legally filed and in effect depends upon the most tenuous
reasoning. Let us review the facts regarding the filing as
established by the evidence in this case. Sec. 54-3-6, U.C.A.
1953, requires common carriers to file their schedules of rates
and charges with the Public Service Commission of Utah. Sec.
54-3-7 prohibits a carrier from charging more or less than the
schedules uon file and in effect." Sec. 54-7-12 U.C.A. 1953
provides that no public utility shall raise any fare "except
upon a showing before the Commission and a finding by the
Commission that such increase is justified." Certainly the term
((commission" as set forth refers to no other commission than
the Public Service Commission of Utah.
The railroads did make application to the Public Service
Commission of Utah for permission to increase their rates.
The Commission, however, did not make a finding that the
increases were justified, but expressly held that the evidence
presented did not warrant an increase (Ex. 2c, Page 43).
The railroads thereupon went to the Interstate Commerce
Commission which issued the void order. Once again the Public
Service Commission, in answer to the ultimatum of the Interstate Commerce Commission, refused to find that the rates
were justified and could go into effect (Ex. 10). The Interstate Commerce Commission then issued its order declaring
the rates were in effect. The railroads, in addition to filing
24
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the new and higher tariffs on Utah intrastate rates with the
Interstate Commerce Commission, also mailed copies of the
new and higher schedules to the Public Service Commission.
Rather than dropping these schedules in the waste basket, as
they no doubt could have done, the Public Service Commission
placed them in a file. It was the position of the railroads in
the court below, and the holding of the court in its conclusions
of law that such placing of these schedules in the file constituted them as legal and valid rates. This was held despite
the fact that they were filed in direct contravention of the
laws of the State of Utah above quoted and in violation of
the orders of the Public Service Commission of Utah. So novel
is this contention that as might be expected, there are no cases
on the point. However, no cases are necessary. As the increased rates as filed were in direct contravention of the
statutes of the state of Utah and of the order of the Public
Service Commission of Utah, they certainly had no force and
effect under the laws of the state of Utah.

POINT FIVE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE SUBSEQUENT ORDER OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ISSUED IN DECEMBER, 1959,
REP AIRED THE DEFECTS FOUND BY THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE EARLIER ORDER.
Following the entry of the mandate of the Supreme Court,
under the direction of which the district court set aside the
Interstate Commerce Commission order raising the Utah intrastate rates, the Interstate Commerce Commission entered on
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further hearings involving Utah intrastate rates. They held
hearings in October of 1958 and January of 1959. On December 7, 1959, they issued an order which became effective
in March of 1960, once again raising Utah intrastate rates.
As has been previously stated, that order is now being attacked
in the federal courts. The case has been argued but as of this
writing no decision has been rendered. However, whether the
subsequent order is set aside or not can have no bearing on this
case. The complete order of the Commission is in this record
as Exhibit No. 11, and it does not purport to have any retroactive effect. All of the findings as appear in the report on
pages 2 5 to 29 of that exhibit are couched in the present tense.
They make no reference to conditions existing prior to December 7, 1959. These findings are just as the Circuit Court,
in Structural Steel & Forge Co. et al v. Union Pacific RR et al,
said they might be ((prospective in effect leaving the subject
matter of these actions unsupported by any valid order."
We do not have a case here such as we had in the Atlantic
Coast Line case where the subsequent order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission merely corrected the defective findings
in the original order and made the finding that the higher
rates should have been in effect during the crucial period. In
our case the Interstate Commerce Commission could not have
made any retroactive finding and did no try to make any retroactive finding. Therefore, the order of December 7, 1959,
whether valid or invalid as will be determined in the federal
court action, is prospective in effect only.
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POINT SIX
Tl--IE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
AN APPLICATION TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH FOR REPARATIONS IS A PREREQUISITE TO THE BRINGING OF AN ACTION IN THE
COURTS 1~0 RECOVER AN OVERCHARGE.
Section 54-7-20 U.C.A. 1953 makes administrative provision for applying to the Public Service Commission of Utah
for reparations in the case of the charging- by the carrier to the
shipper of either an unlawful or illegal rate. The court below
held that this remedy was exclusive and abrogated any right
which a shipper might have to direct recourse to the courts.
In the first place it should be pointed out that the language of
54-7-20 is inconsistent with any theory that it is the exclusive
remedy. The statute says that when an excessive rate has been
charged, nthe Commission may order that the public utility
make due reparation.'' An election is therefore left to the Public
Service Commission as to whether it will or will not issue a
reparations order even when the circumstances justify it. The
statute is silent on the question of whether or not the statutory
remedy is exclusive. If it is held to be exclusive it must be on
the basis of implication. Certainly it would not be consistent
to say that the statute by implication takes away a right which
the shipper had at common law merely because the Public
Service Commission may in its discretion take jurisdiction of
a reparations case. Suppose the Commission does not want to
take jurisdiction, and it appears it does not have to under the
law, then the shipper has been deprived of a right in the courts
and has not been given an equal administrative right.
27
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It is the position of the appellants that the Utah case of
Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. v. Denver & R.G. RR. Co., 60 Utah
153, 207 P. 155, is determinative in this matter. In the Jeremy
case the statute involved is a different statute from 54-7-20.
However, the principles are the same. In that case the shipper
brought action for an overcharge. The defendant railroads
alleged that as Section 454, Compiled Laws of Utah 1907,
provided a statutory remedy for shippers who were overcharged, the common law right of action was abrogated. The
court discussed this matter at some length as follows:
nit is contended that this statute gives a complete
remedy to a shipper who has been overcharged, and,
being in force when plaintiff's cause of action accrued,
the shipper has no remedy at common law. Winsor
v. C. & A. R.R. (C.C.) 52 Fed. 716, and Beadle v.
Railroad, 51 Kan. 248, 32 Pac. 910, squarely support
the proposition advanced by appellant. The same rule
is laid down in I Rorer on Railroads, p. 570. There is,
however, a contrariety of opinion upon this subject.
In 2 Elliott on Railroads, § 711, the rule is asserted
to be that«Unless the common-law right of action is thereby
taken away in express terms or by necessary implication,
the penalty imposed by a penal statute is cumulative
only, and the common-law right of action continues to
exist unimpaired.'
nin 10 C.J. p. 451, § 709, it is said:
«The common-law remedy for excessive freight
charges is not abrogated by a statute authorizing recovery of the charges collected in excess of the rates
properly chargeable under a railroad commission law.'
USe also, 4 R.C.L. 654 § 131.
28
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" In I-Ieiserman v. B., C.R. & N.R.R., 63 Iowa, 732,
18 N.W. 903, it is held that:
(The liability of defendant for money collected for
the transportation of property, in excess of reasonable
charges, existed at common law. The enactment of a
statute imposing penalties for excessive charges, recoverable by the party in jured, or providing that for
exacting and collecting them the agent of the railroad
company shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, does not
take away the right existipg at common law to recover
money paid in excess of reasonable charges. * * * The
injured party may waive the tort created by statute,
and sue upon the implied contract raised by the law,
whereby the carrier is obliged to repay the consignee
or consignor of the property all sums exacted in excess
of reasonable compensation.'
'(See, also, Fletcher Paper Co. v. D. & M.R.R., 198
Mich. 469, 164 N.W. 528; Smith v. C. & N.W. Co.,
49 Wis. 443, 5 N.W. 240; Goodridge v. U.P.R.R. Co.
( C.C.) 35 Fed. 3 5; La Floridienne v. A.C.L.R.R., 63
Fla. 208, 212, 58 South 182; Sullivan v. Railroad, 121
Minn 488, 142 N.W. 3, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 612.
"The statute of this state which was in force when
plaintiffs cause of action accrued did not suspend
other remedies and did not abrogate the common-law
remedy. As plaintiffs cause of action was not based
upon the statute, the court committed no error in overruling appellant's demurrer which raised the question
of the statute of limitations.''
The existence of Section 54-7-20 was not raised as a
defense by the railroads in the Jeremy case, even though that
section was in force and effect in 1919 when the Jeremy case
was tried and decided. It was not in effect between November
of 1914 and November of 1917 when the excessive rates were
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charged. However, if it was a good defense it could have
been raised because it is a too well established point of law
to require comment that while substantive rights are determined by the laV\t in effect at the time the cause of action arises,
procedural remedies are governed by the law in effect when
the action is commenced. Therefore, the Jeremy case was tried
with the exact provisions in effect that are relied upon here.
In the Annotations to Sec. 54-7-20 under the heading
Remedies is found the following footnote:
((Under subd. (2) of this section the shipper may
invoke any common-law remedies he may have to
recover excessive and discriminatory freight charges.
In other words, the statutory remedies are cumulative.
Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 60
U. 153, 207 P. 155."
Clearly, therefore, the compilers of the code regarded
the Jeremy case as controlling in regard to Sec. 54-7-20.
There are a number of cases from other jurisdictions
which hold that where reparation is sought on the ground that
the rate charges is an ((unlawful rate/' as we have above described that term, application should first be made to the
administrative body. The basis of the holding in these cases
is to the effect that recourse should first be had to the commission because the determination of what was fair and just
rates is a complicated matter which requires a certain amount
of expertness. Therefore when reparations are sought on the
basis that public tariffs are too high, recourse should first be
had to the commission which has the jurisdiction to approve
the tariffs to determine whether in fact the tariffs are too high.
ln this case the question of whether or not the tariffs are too
30

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

high or too low is beside the point. We are seeking reparations
on the ground that the rates charged are in excess of the legally
published rates. A court is as well equipped as a commission
to determine that question. Furthermore the commission has
already determined by approving the filings that are in effect,
that the filed rates are just and reasonable. We have a statute
requiring that no charges shall be made in excess of these
established rates. There appears to be nothing, therefore,
which the court cannot do in a common law action as expeditious! y as the commission could do in an application made
to the commission for reparations.
The Interstate Commerce Act has a provision conferring
jurisdiction on the Interstate Commerce Commission to hear
applications for reparation in the case of interstate rates. This
provision of the Interstate Commerce Act, however, expressly
reserves to shippers their common law rights and therefore is
not directly in point here. However, a California case interpreting the California statute in light of the Interstate Commerce Act is in point. Sec. 71 of the Public Utilities Act of
California confers jurisdiction on the Public Utilities Commission to hear reparations claims. That statute, like ours,
is silent on the question of whether the statutory remedy is
exclusive or cumulative. In holding that it is cumulative, the
Supreme Court of California in the case of Southern Pacific
v. Superior Court, 150 Pac. 397, reasoned as follows, from
the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act:
((That the interpretation which has been placed upon
the Interstate Commerce Act by the highest court of
the land should be followed by this court ,when like
questions arise out of state laws, results not because
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of any compelling authority, since for the most part
these are questions for local determination. But it is
evident that the system of regulation of rates and
fares provided in the Constitution and statutes of
California, to which we have referred, has been
modeled upon the federal act for the regulation of
commerce between the states. This being so, it will be
assumed that the people of California, in enacting the
same or similar terms of their written law, intended
to express the same meaning as that established as
the true meaning of the law from which these laws of
the state have been derived."
In the above case an action for reparations was sought on
the grounds that the railroad had charged the shipper $28.97
for a certain shipment, whereas in fact the tariffs on file and
in effect provided for a charge of $15.98. The action was for
the difference of $12.99. The railroad in that case, as have
the railroads here, maintained that the common law action
was abrogated by the statutes providing the statutory remedy.
The court concluded as follows:
((Our sole concern is to ascertain and to determine
\\'hether the subject-matter of the case was within the
jurisdiction of the court which rendered the judgment.
In view of the several provisions of the written law
to which we have referred and some of which are fully
set forth herein, and in the light of the decisions to
which reference has been made, we are of the opinion
that the superior court had jurisdiction to hear and
determine the case presented to it and to render the
judgment."
The basis of all the cases holding that recourse may be
had either to the courts or to the commission, where a statutory
method of gaining reparation is provided, is that the statute
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creates a tort action and, to use the language quoted \Vith
approval in the Jeremy case, nthe injured party may waiye
the tort created by statute, and sue upon the implied contract
raised by the law, whereby the carrier is obliged to repay the
consignee or consignor of the property all sums exacted in
excess of reasonable compensation."
Furthermore, we \vould like to point out here that if
the statutory remedy with its short statute of limitations was
exclusive, the statute of limitations would have run on a
substantial portion of the plaintiff's claims in this case prior
to the time that they were able to get the Supreme Court of
the United States to act and declare void the invalid order of
the Interstate Commerce Commission under which the railroads
purported to be collecting the illegal rates.
CONCLUSION
Counsel submits that the lower court interpreted the law
erroneously in this case. The order of the Interstate Commerce
Commission relied upon by the defendants was issued without
jurisdiction and was void from its inception. The rates charged
were clearly illegal under the laws of the State of Utah. The
plaintiffs had the right to proceed in this court to recover the
amount over and above the legal rates. This matter, therefore,
should be returned to the District Court with orders to enter
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and to proceed to determine
the amount of the overcharges.
Respectfully submitted,
CALVIN L. RAMPTON

Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
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